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This article examines the affect of acquiescentia in Spinoza’s Ethics, presenting an original 
interpretation of acquiescentia which illuminates the account of blessedness developed in 
Part V of the Ethics. It also shows how Spinoza’s complex but coherent account of 
acquiescentia has been obscured by inconsistent translations of acquiescentia, and forms of 
the verb acquiescere, in the standard English edition of the Ethics. Spinoza’s discussion of 
acquiescentia both draws on and critiques the equivalent Cartesian passion, la satisfaction de 
soi-même, which is translated as ‘acquiescentia in se ipso’ in the Latin edition of the 
Passions of the Soul. For Spinoza, acquiescentia is an inherently cognitive affect, since it 
involves an idea of oneself (as the cause of one’s joy). As such, the affect is closely 
correlated to the three kinds of cognition identified by Spinoza in Ethics II. Just as there are 
three kinds of cognition, so there are three kinds of acquiescentia – a point that has hitherto 
been missed by commentators. Two qualities – stillness and obedience – provide the criteria 
for distinguishing true or genuine acquiescentia from its false, “empty” counterpart, 
corresponding to imaginatio. According to Spinoza, Descartes’s conception of acquiescentia 
belongs entirely to this inadequate, confused kind of cognition. The qualities of stillness and 
obedience also distinguish between two kinds of true acquiescentia, corresponding to ratio 





In Part IV of the Ethics Spinoza writes that “self-esteem [acquiescentia in se ipso] is really 
the highest thing we can hope for.”1 He opposes this affect to both humility and repentance, 
which are integral to Christian virtue; he describes pride – for Augustine, the root of sin – as 
a kind of acquiescentia in se ipso. Of course, Spinoza’s distinctive views about God were 
enough to draw the charge of atheism from many of his contemporaries. But one of these 
critics, Pierre Poiret, took the suggestion that we should aspire above all to “self-esteem” as a 
clear sign that Spinoza’s philosophy was immoral and unchristian. For Poiret, acquiescentia 
in se ipso is “a vice, head and root of all [vices], and true atheism.”2 Today the idea that self-
esteem is the most we can hope for sounds less shocking – we might come across it in any 
lifestyle magazine. As Poiret anticipated, it seems to signal the naturalistic outlook of our 
age: humanist at best, nihilist at worst. But is this really Spinoza’s view? Why would a 
philosopher who argues that our “blessedness” involves knowledge and love of God, and the 
eternity of our minds, conclude that “self-esteem is really the highest thing we can hope for”? 
 This paper shows why we cannot attribute this view to Spinoza. More precisely, the 
decision to translate acquiescentia in se ipso as ‘self-esteem’ in the standard English edition 
of the Ethics both distorts and obscures Spinoza’s account of the human good. Although 
many commentators acknowledge that this translation is questionable, most nevertheless 
follow Edwin Curley in adopting it.3 This is not to suggest that acquiescentia in se ipso has 
nothing to do with our modern concept of self-esteem. Nor is it to deny that those scholars 
who accept Curley’s translation offer sophisticated and illuminating discussions of this affect 
and its role within Spinoza’s thought.4 And Curley himself had good reasons for using 
different English words for acquiescentia over the course of the Ethics, for as we shall see the 
meaning of acquiescentia varies according to the epistemic, psychological and ethical 
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condition of the individual who experiences it. However, several important features of 
acquiescentia have been lost in translation. 
 First, the standard translation muddles the connections between Spinoza’s discussion 
of acquiescentia and the source text for this concept, Descartes’s Passions of the Soul. 
Second, this translation obscures continuities between acquiescentia in se ipso in Parts III 
and IV of the Ethics, and the “satisfaction of mind” (acquiescentia animi) and “true peace of 
mind” (vera animi acquiescentia) attributed to the wise man in Ethics V.5 Third – and this is 
connected to the previous point – it obscures the way Spinoza distinguishes between different 
kinds of acquiescentia. As we shall see, acquiescentia is an inherently cognitive affect, which 
can be based on any of the three kinds of cognition that Spinoza identifies in the Ethics: 
imagination, reason, and intuitive knowledge.6 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, 
translating acquiescentia in se ipso as ‘self-esteem’ fails to capture the meaning that 
acquiescentia has for Spinoza. This meaning is twofold: on the one hand, the Latin root quies 
signifies stillness, quiet, rest; on the other hand, the verb acquiescere also carries the sense of 
acceptance, submission or obedience conveyed by the English ‘acquiesce’. The concept of 
acquiescentia, taken in this twofold meaning, indicates the distinctive character of the 
freedom, virtue and blessedness which Spinoza opposes to an unfree, illusory kind of 
existence (and particularly to an unfree, illusory kind of religion). More precisely, 
acquiescentia conveys the affective, experiential dimension of this highest human good, what 
we might call its feeling-quality. In this way, it takes its place among – and contributes 
something distinctive to – the cluster of concepts that define beatitudo: intuitive knowledge, 
eternity, and the intellectual love of God. 
 Since the English ‘acquiescence’ captures the twofold sense of stillness or rest, and 
acceptance or obedience, ‘acquiescence in oneself’ may not be a bad translation of 
acquiescentia in se ipso.7 However, this leaves out the joy that is integral to Spinoza”s 
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definition of acquiescentia in se ipso – whereas ‘self-esteem’ at least conveys the idea of 
positive feeling. Perhaps ‘self-contentment’ offers the best compromise between 
‘acquiescence in oneself’ and ‘self-esteem’, since contentment suggests a peaceful kind of 
joy. In her 1856 translation of the Ethics George Eliot interprets acquiescentia in se ipso in 
this way: her Spinoza claims that “self-contentment is in truth the highest point we can hope 
to attain”.8 Eliot translates Part V”s acquiescentia animi as “repose of mind” (VP27) or 
“peace of mind”, so that like Curley she obfuscates the continuity between the acquiescentia 
of Parts III and IV and that of Part V.  Donald Rutherford may be right to suggest that “there 
is no fully satisfactory translation of the phrase [acquiescentia in se ipso] in English.”9  In 
this paper, then, acquiescentia will remain untranslated, in order to retain the rich and 
multiple resonance the term has for Spinoza.  
 The first section of this paper considers how Spinoza’s concept of acquiescentia is 
formed by, and responsive to, Descartes’s discussion of la satisfaction de soi-meme.  The 
second section elucidates Spinoza’s account of acquiescentia according to his three kinds of 
cognition, showing that each kind of cognition has its corresponding affect of acquiescentia.  
The concluding section summarises this Spinozist theory of acquiescentia, indicates its place 
within his philosophical system, and briefly raises the question of how acquiescentia might 
be cultivated in practice. 
 
 
1.  Spinoza’s acquiescentia in se ipso and Descartes’s satisfaction de soi-meme 
 
For Spinoza, acquiescentia was a new term, not known before its use in Descartes’s Passions 
of the Soul. According to Christian Wolff, Descartes “introduced acquiescentia in seipso into 
philosophy.”10 But of course Wolff is referring to the first Latin translation of Les passions de 
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l’âme, completed by Henri Desmarets in 1650, just a year after the French original.11 So 
Desmarets, rather than Descartes, should be credited with bringing acquiescentia into the 
philosophical vocabulary.12 In the second part of Les passions de l’âme Descartes defines and 
discusses a series of particular passions, among them la satisfaction de soy-mesme, which he 
opposes to le Repentir. In translating article 63 of Les passions de l’âme, Part II, Desmarets 
chooses ‘acquiescentia in se ipso’ for la Satisfaction de soy-mesme, and ‘dat nobis 
acquiescentiam interiorem’ for nous donne une Satisfaction interior. Article 190, in Part III 
of Descartes’s text, returns to la Satisfaction de soy-mesme, and this time Desmarets chooses, 
twice, Satisfactio sive Acquiescentia in se ipso.13 
 Why does Desmarets coin the neologism acquiescentia to translate Descartes’s la 
satisfaction, instead of using only the more obvious satisfactio? Acquiescentia conveys 
stillness or rest, and although this sense may be implicit in satisfactio, it is made much more 
explicit by acquiescentia. In article 190 Descartes emphasises that this quality of stillness or 
rest belongs to la Satisfaction de soy mesme of the consistently virtuous person: la 
Satisfaction, qu’ont tous-jours ceux qui constamment la vertu, est une habitude en leur âme, 
qui se nomme tranquillité & repos de conscience.14 Desmarets translates the latter part of this 
sentence as “Tranquillitas & Quies Conscientiae”, and he amplifies it by identifying the 
passion of la satisfaction as acquiescentia as well as satisfactio. This decision is not 
unfaithful to the original text. But while Descartes explicates ‘satisfaction’ in terms of 
‘tranquillité’ and ‘repos’, Desmarets makes ‘quies’ integral to this passion, and thus 
inseparable from it. 
 Spinoza’s incorporation of the term acquiescentia in se ipso into his own discussion 
of the affects in Ethics III and IV engages closely with Descartes’s Passions of the Soul.15 
Spinoza is clearly indebted to the Cartesian account of la satisfaction de soi-même, and it is 
equally clear that he engages critically with it. This close critical engagement is partially 
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obscured when Spinoza’s acquiescentia in se ipso is translated into English as ‘self-esteem’, 
while the corresponding Cartesian passion is translated as ‘self-satisfaction’.16 (And 
confusion is further encouraged by the fact that Descartes’s la satisfaction de soi-même is a 
distinct passion from l’estime, which is coupled with and opposed to le mépris in article 54.)  
 Six features of Descartes’s discussion of ‘self-satisfaction’ are echoed in Spinoza’s 
discussion of acquiescentia in se ipso: 
   
(1) ‘Self-satisfaction’ is a joy relating to an action that a person has caused herself: 
“We may consider the cause of a good or evil, present as well as past.  A good done by 
ourselves gives us an internal satisfaction.”17 This joy, Descartes emphasises, “depends 
completely on ourselves.”18 Similarly, Spinoza states that “I shall call Joy accompanied by 
the idea of an internal cause, Acquiescentia in se ipso,” and that “Acquiescentia in se ipso is a 
Joy born of the fact that a man considers himself and his own power of acting.”19 
(2) Self-satisfaction is coupled with, and opposed to, repentance (le repentir). 
Descartes defines repentance as “a kind of sadness” that “results from believing we have 
done an evil deed.”20 Similarly, in Ethics III Spinoza identifies “the sadness contrary to 
acquiescentia in se ipso as repentance.”21 In his “Definitions of the Affects” he qualifies this 
by distinguishing between two senses of acquiescentia in se ipso: one opposed to humility, 
and the other opposed to repentance. (We will return to this distinction in the second section 
of the paper.) 
(3) Descartes elevates self-satisfaction above the other passions, insofar as he 
describes it as “the sweetest of all the passions” (while repentance is “the most 
bitter…because its causes lie in ourselves alone”).22 As we have seen, Spinoza suggests that 
“Acquiescentia in se ipso is really the highest thing we can hope for”. 
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(4) Self-satisfaction can be either “a habit of the soul” or “a passion”, depending on 
whether it accompanies the steadfast pursuit of virtue, or arises as a “fresh satisfaction” 
following the performance of “an action we think good.”23 Spinoza echoes this distinction in 
his account of acquiescentia. Like all the affects, acquiescentia can be predominantly 
passive, “a confused idea,” and fleeting, contributing to “vacillations of mind.”24 In contrast 
with the “ignorant man,” the “wise man” enjoys lasting acquiescentia, “always possesses true 
peace of mind [vera animi acquiescentia].”25 
(5) Having distinguished between the “habit” and the “passion” of self-satisfaction, 
Descartes suggests that the latter may be either genuine or “vain”. When the cause of our 
self-satisfaction “is not just, i.e. when the actions from which we derive great satisfaction are 
not very important or are even vicious, [then our] satisfaction is absurd and serves only to 
produce a kind of vanity and impertinent arrogance.”26 In the Ethics, Spinoza identifies this 
deluded form of self-satisfaction as pride (Superbia), defined as “thinking more highly of 
oneself than is just, out of love for oneself.”27 Pride is a species of acquiescentia in se ipso: 
“it can also be defined as love of oneself, or acquiescentia in se ipso, insofar as it so affects a 
man that he thinks more highly of himself than is just.”28 More generally, though, Spinoza 
suggests that acquiescentia itself, not just its prideful form, can be “empty” (vana).29 
(6) Descartes illustrates his description of vain self-satisfaction by the example of 
religious bigotry, hypocrisy and violence. Just over half of article 190 is devoted to this 
example, which is depicted in particularly vivid and forceful terms. The “vanity” and 
“impertinent arrogance” of deluded self-satisfaction, writes Descartes,  
 
<ext> 
is noticeable especially in those who believe themselves devout, but are merely bigoted and 
superstitious. These are people who – under the pretext of frequently going to church, 
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reciting many prayers, wearing their hair short, fasting, and giving alms – think that they are 
absolutely perfect and imagine that they are such close friends of God that they could not do 
anything to displease him. They suppose that anything their passion dictates is a 
commendable zeal, even though it sometimes dictates the greatest crimes that men can 
commit, such as the betrayal of cities, the killing of sovereigns, and the extermination of 
whole peoples for the sole reason that they do not accept their opinions.30   
</ext> 
 
The specificity and detail of this passage suggests that Descartes’s observations of errant 
religiosity provide not simply an example of vain self-satisfaction, but the motivation for his 
account of this passion. Perhaps these observations constitute the context for his discussion of 
the entire concept of self-satisfaction – both true and false, virtuous and vicious. The 
connections between Spinoza’s account of acquiescentia and superstitious religion will be 
explicated in some detail in the following section of this paper. Spinoza’s critique of 
superstition provides an important context for the Ethics, and in particular for his analysis of 
the affects and of “human bondage”. Spinoza understands superstition in both cognitive and 
affective terms (indeed, these are not really separable for him): superstition is always based 
on inadequate cognition, and manifest in the passion of fear, and as such it is opposed to the 
freedom and blessedness arising from adequate understanding and manifest in the active 
affect of love.31 This contrast between inadequate cognition and fear, on the one hand, and 
adequate knowledge and love on the other, shows up in Spinoza’s distinction between two 
kinds of acquiescentia. He criticises the “empty” acquiescentia in se ipso “that is encouraged 
only by the opinion of the multitude,” not only because it is irrational but because it makes 
people both fearful and violent: “he who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made 
anxious daily… this gives rise to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way 
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possible.”32 However, true acquiescentia in se ipso arises from reason: “the greatest 
acquiescentia in se ipso there can be arises from [man’s] reflection [on his] true power of 
acting, or virtue, [which] is reason itself.”33 This authentic acquiescentia in se ipso involves a 
just love for oneself, i.e. a joy in one’s own power of acting, accompanied by (indeed, 
inseparable from) the adequate idea of oneself as the cause of this joy. 
 
There are, then, significant continuities between Descartes’s satisfaction de soi-meme 
and Spinoza’s acquiescentia in se ipso. However, Spinoza appropriates these six 
characteristics of la satisfaction de soi-même in a way that critiques and subverts the 
Cartesian passion. This appropriation targets a central tenet of Cartesian philosophy: the 
freedom of the human will. For Descartes, virtue consists in the rational exercise of free will 
– and this is particularly relevant to the twin passions of self-satisfaction and repentance, 
since we deserve to be praised or blamed only for using our freedom well or badly. These 
passions accompany deeds “done by ourselves,” that is to say deeds caused by “ourselves 
alone,” through our own volitions. Self-satisfaction is closely connected to générosité, which 
is for Descartes “the key to all the other virtues and a general remedy for every disorder of 
the passions.”34 Descartes explains that générosité involves both the affirmation of human 
freedom and the “constant resolution” to use this freedom well.35 “There is only one thing in 
us which could give us good reason to esteem ourselves, namely, the exercise of our free will 
and the control we have over our volitions,” writes Descartes.36 
We have seen that Descartes distinguishes between true and illusory, vain self-
satisfaction, identifying superstitious religion with the latter. For Spinoza, however, the 
whole Cartesian concept of self-satisfaction – along with its mirror image, repentance – 
belongs within the category of illusion. We only imagine that our wills are free, and 
imagination (the “first kind of cognition”) is inadequate.37 A “decision of the mind which is 
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believed to be free is not distinguished from the imagination itself,” writes Spinoza, 
concluding that those who “believe that they do anything from a free decision of the mind, 
dream with open eyes.”38 He argues that the idea of free decision is a “fiction”.39 Throughout 
the Ethics he asserts that belief in free will is a symptom of ignorance: “men think themselves 
free, because they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think…of the 
causes by which they are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant of those 
causes.”40 In fact, Spinoza states plainly, “the will cannot be a free cause, but only a 
necessary one” – and this applies to both God and human beings.41 
When Spinoza defines acquiescentia in se ipso together with repentance in his 
“Definitions of the Affects”, he links both affects to the erroneous belief in free will.42 He 
distinguishes this inadequate form of acquiescentia in se ipso from a more neutral form – that 
opposed to humility – which does not involve the idea of free will: 
 
<ext> 
Acquiescentia in se ipso is opposed to Humility, insofar as we understand by it a Joy born of 
the fact that we consider our power of acting. But insofar as we also understand by it a Joy, 
accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decision 
of the Mind, it is opposed to Repentance, which we define as follows.43 
Repentance is a Sadness accompanied by the idea of some deed we believe ourselves to have 
done from a free decision of the Mind.44 
</ext> 
 
In his Explanation to the latter definition, Spinoza refers the reader back to Part II: “On the 
free decision of the Mind, see IIP35s.” The reference is damning. The scholium to IIP35 
elucidates the proposition that “Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which 
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inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve” using the example of belief in free 
will: “men are deceived in thinking themselves free… they say that human actions depend on 
the will, but these are only words for which they have no idea.  For all are ignorant of what 
the will is.”45 Thus Spinoza presents the Cartesian affects of acquiescentia in se ipso and 
repentance as intrinsically inadequate. Indeed, these affects are irredeemably bound up with a 
proliferation of negative connotations: falsity, privation of knowledge, mutilated and 
confused ideas, self-deception, ignorance. 
 In distinguishing between true and vain self-satisfaction, Descartes suggests that the 
latter can lead to violence and persecution: “it sometimes dictate the greatest crimes that men 
can commit, such as…the extermination of whole peoples.” But for Spinoza it is the 
misguided commitment to free will which produces, or at least stimulates, the kind of 
violence Descartes describes. At EIIIP49 he argues that the fiction of free will exacerbates 
the affects of both love and hatred: “because men consider themselves to be free, they have a 
greater love or hate toward one another than toward other things.”46 Spinoza returns to this 
point at EVP5, this time emphasising the link between belief in free will and ignorance: 
“imagining a thing as free can be nothing but simply imagining it while we are ignorant of 
the causes by which it has been determined to act.”47 In describing the affective consequences 
of the idea of free will, he refers specifically to acquiescentia in se ipso and repentance. 
Having repeated his definition of these affects as joy or sadness “accompanied by the idea of 
oneself as cause,” he adds that “Because men believe themselves to be free, these affects are 
very violent (see P49).”48 
 Alongside this, as other commentators have noted, Spinoza rids acquiescentia and 
repentance of the moral force of their corresponding Cartesian passions.49 While Descartes 
defines self-satisfaction and repentance with reference to “good” or “evil” deeds, Spinoza 
omits these terms from his definitions. We have seen that he presents a neutral definition of 
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acquiescentia in se ipso, coupled with the affect of humility (in contrast to the more Cartesian 
definition of acquiescentia in se ipso, coupled with repentance, that involves believe in free 
will). These neutral definitions characterise both affects in terms of sheer quantity of power: 
“Acquiescentia in se ipso is a Joy born of the fact that a man considers himself and his own 
power of acting… Humility is a Sadness born of the fact that a man considers his own lack of 
power, or weakness.”50 In the Explanation to his definition of repentance, Spinoza reflects on 
the moral force of this affect, and of its corresponding acquiescentia. He attributes this to 




it is no wonder Sadness follows absolutely from all those acts which from custom are called 
wrong, and Joy, those which are called right. For from what has been said above we easily 
understand that this depends chiefly on education. Parents – by blaming the former acts, and 
often scolding their children on account of them, and on the other hand, by recommending 
and praising the latter acts – have brought it about that the emotions of Sadness were joined 
to the one kind of act, and those of Joy to the other. 
Experience itself also confirms this. For not everyone has the same custom and Religion… 
according as each one has been educated, so he either repents of a deed or exults at being 
esteemed for it.51 
</ext> 
 
Spinoza seems to present this simply as a fact of experience: he does not explicitly criticise 
the effects of moral education in shaping affective habits. In broader context, though, we 
have seen that he associates both moralism and immorality – especially the kind that 
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accompanies superstitious religion – with the mistaken belief in free will. This is not merely a 
critique of Descartes, who on Spinoza’s view is reflecting the outlook that has developed 
within the Christian tradition, and which had in his time come to dominate that tradition. But 
there is perhaps a sense that Descartes, as a philosopher, should have known better.52 
 
 
2. Acquiescentia and the three kinds of cognition 
 
Having clarified how Spinoza’s discussion of acquiescentia in se ipso responds to Descartes, 
we may now examine more closely the account of acquiescentia developed through the 
Ethics. Like any species of love or hate, acquiescentia in se ipso is an inherently cognitive 
affect, since it involves the idea of a cause. Thus Spinoza’s account of acquiescentia is 
structured according to his distinction between three kinds of cognition: (1) opinion or 
imagination, (2) reason, (3) intuitive knowledge.53 The relationship between acquiescentia 
and these three kinds of cognition illuminates the continuity and coherence of Spinoza’s 
discussion of acquiescentia, on the one hand, and the complexity or “polyvalence” of the 
concept, on the other.54 Using different English terms to translate acquiescentia as it appears 
and reappears through Parts III to V of the text obscures Spinoza’s use of acquiescentia to 
denote a single affect which varies according to the kind of cognition that produces it.55   
When acquiescentia is understood in terms of the three kinds of cognition, its 
significance within Spinoza’s philosophical system becomes clear. And it is not just that the 
three kinds of cognition illuminate acquiescentia; reciprocally, Spinoza’s account of 
acquiescentia illuminates the three kinds of cognition. In particular, it indicates the 
experiential qualities by which these kinds of cognition can be recognised and distinguished. 
It is through the different forms of acquiescentia that we feel the effects of the different kinds 
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of knowledge within our own being. To put it another way: we human beings live in relation 
to ourselves, with a certain understanding or awareness of ourselves, and this relationship 
always has an affective dimension. When it is based on imagination, acquiescentia is a 
hollow, volatile, egotistical satisfaction; when it is rooted in the second, rational kind of 
knowledge, it becomes a stable joy that can be shared with others; within the third kind of 
knowledge, acquiescentia signifies the feeling-quality of participation in God’s eternity, 
giving content to the apparently abstract idea of intellectual love of God. And this affect, in 
its variable forms, links Spinoza’s critique of free will, of Cartesian philosophy, and of 
superstition, with his account of true understanding and blessedness. 
 Throughout the Ethics, acquiescentia is used in a way that accurately reflects 
Spinoza’s formal definition of this affect. According to this definition, acquiescentia is a joy 
accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause (or by the idea of an “internal cause”), a joy that 
arises when we consider ourselves and our power of acting.56 All the instances of 
acquiescentia discussed in Parts III, IV and V consistently fit this description. But Spinoza 
states that some of these instances are vana (false, empty, vain, untrustworthy), while others 
are vera (true, genuine, properly named, well-founded). Since his definition of the affect 
encompasses both true and false acquiescentia, we have to look to the qualities of stillness 
and obedience signified by the word itself to provide the criteria for distinguishing them. If a 
joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause lacks these qualities, it must be vana. As we 
might expect of this cognitive affect, the inadequate understanding produced by the first kind 
of cognition gives rise to false acquiescentia, while the adequate understanding gained in the 
second and third kinds of knowledge generates true acquiescentia. But there are significant 
differences between the true acquiescentia arising from reason, and that arising from scientia 
intuitiva. Here, neither the definition of the affect nor the distinction between adequate and 
inadequate cognition can explain this difference: again, it is the particular qualities of 
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stillness and obedience conveyed by the word acquiescentia that provide the decisive criteria. 
So just as there are three kinds of cognition, so there are three kinds of acquiescentia.  Let us 
examine each of these in turn. 
 
 
(1) Acquiescentia of the first kind 
 
We have already encountered this defective acquiescentia in considering Spinoza’s critique 
of the equivalent Cartesian passion, la satisfaction de soi-meme. But here we will look more 
closely at how it relates to the “cognition of the first kind” based on “opinion or 
imagination.”57 When Spinoza introduces the affect of acquiescentia in se ipso at IIIP30 and 
defines it for the first time, he connects it to imagination: “If someone has done something 
which he imagines affects others with Joy, he will be affected by Joy accompanied by the 
idea of himself as cause, or he will regard himself with Joy.”58 When he defines it again at 
IIIP51, this time in conjunction with repentance, he emphasises that “the things which [a 
man] believes will make for Joy or Sadness, and which he therefore strives to promote or 
prevent, are often only imaginary,” and links this with the “inconstancy” of human nature and 
judgement.59 It is here that he adds that “Because men believe themselves free, these affects 
[of acquiescentia in se ipso and repentance] are very violent.” Belief in free will is not the 
basis of imaginary thinking, but a particularly significant instance of it.   
 The first kind of cognition encompasses “opinion” as well as “imagination”. Spinoza 
brings these two together at IIIP53, where he asserts that “when the Mind considers itself and 
its power of acting, it rejoices, and does so the more, the more distinctly it imagines itself and 
its power of acting.” In the corollary to this proposition, he points out that “this Joy is more 
and more encouraged the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others. For the more 
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he imagines himself to be praised by others, the greater the Joy with which he imagines 
himself to affect others.”60 The joy of acquiescentia is conditioned by public opinion: by the 
values and attitudes of society in general, and of our own circle of acquaintances in 
particular. According to Spinoza, these opinions are often (though not necessarily) prejudices 
and superstitions. Because the affects of acquiescentia and gloria (Curley: ‘love of esteem’) 
are closely connected, our relationship to ourselves is intimately bound up with our 
relationships to others.61 This means that the problems associated with imaginative 
acquiescentia are often compounded by social influences.  
 Spinoza’s general account of the affects in Part III emphasises their instability. 
Summing up this discussion in the scholium to EIIIP59, he links the affects with “vacillations 
of mind” – affectus, animique fluctuationes – and writes that “from what has been said it is 
clear that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves on the 
sea, driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not knowing our outcome or our fate.”62 
Similarly, at EVP2 Spinoza seems to equate affect with vacillation or agitation: here he refers 
to animi commotionem, seu affectum and suggests that the affects of love and hate cause 
animi fluctuationes.63 With regard to acquiescentia (of the first kind) in particular, he 
identifies two related consequences of this instability: it makes individuals anxious within 
themselves, and troublesome to others.   
Spinoza hints at the anxiety-provoking character of acquiescentia in the scholium to 
IIIP55, where we find the third definition of the affect, this time Philautia, vel Acquiescentia 
in se ipso, as “Joy arising from considering ourselves.”64 Because this joy “is renewed as 
often as a man considers his virtues, or his power of acting, it also happens that everyone is 
anxious [gestiat] to tell his own deeds, and to show off his powers, both of body and of 
mind.” Spinoza adds here that “men, for this reason, are very troublesome to one another 
[homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint].”65 He makes this point much more 
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explicitly, though, when he returns to the subject of false, empty acquiescentia in Part IV. 
Here, it is opinion rather than imagination that emerges as the distinctive feature of the self-
understanding that this acquiescentia is based upon: 
 
<ext> 
The love of esteem [Gloria] which is called empty [vana] is self-esteem [acquiescentia in se 
ipso] that is encouraged only by the opinion of the multitude. When that ceases, the 
acquiescentia in se ipso ceases, i.e. (by P52s), the highest good that each one loves. That is 
why he who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made anxious daily, strives, 
sacrifices and schemes [quotidianâ curâ anxius nitatur, faciat, experiatur], in order to 
preserve his reputation. For the multitude is fickle and inconstant; unless one’s reputation is 
guarded, it is quickly destroyed.66 
</ext> 
 
As well as making themselves anxious, people who pursue this acquiescentia become 
aggressively competitive with others. Indeed, those who succeed in gaining it may be the 
worst of all. In this struggle for acquiescentia, “the one who at last emerges as victor exults 
more in having harmed the other than in having benefited himself.”67 Spinoza emphasises in 
this passage that it is precisely because acquiescentia is the “highest thing we can hope for,” 
“the highest good that each one loves,” that the false acquiescentia arising from inadequate 
understanding has such destructive consequences: “since this struggle is over a good thought 
to be the highest this gives rise to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way 
possible.”68 Here, then, Spinoza argues that acquiescentia is as volatile as the opinions it rests 
on, generating agitation within both individuals and communities. In other words, it not only 
fails to produce the quies that belongs to genuine acquiescentia, but encourages unrest. It is 
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not surprising that Spinoza concludes this paragraph by stating that “This love of esteem, or 
acquiescentia, then, is really empty, because it is nothing [Est igitur haec gloria, seu 
acquiescentia reverâ vana, quia nulla est].”69 
 Right at the end of the Ethics, when he contrasts the “wise man” with the “ignorant 
man”, Spinoza returns to this idea that the person who lacks adequate knowledge is restless, 
anxious, agitated. The ignorant person is “troubled in many ways [multis modis agitatur] by 
external causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind [vera animi acquiescentia].”70 
Here the link between agitation, subjection to external causes, and false acquiescentia 
becomes more explicit than hitherto – it was implied in IVP55, and in EIIIP59 we heard that 
“we are driven about in many ways by external causes” due to the “vacillations” of the 
affects in general. All human beings are influenced by external causes: Spinoza thinks that it 
is impossible not to be.71 But being subject to forces beyond our control – so that they limit 
our power of acting, and so that we feel their effects within us – does not necessarily mean 
that we are “driven about” and thus rendered unstable by them. The ignorant man described 
at the conclusion to the Ethics is dominated by external causes: he is so entirely determined 
by them that they constitute his very existence, so that “as soon as he ceases to be acted on, 
he ceases to be.”72 
 This emphasis on the power of external causes might appear at odds with the 
definition of acquiescentia, which as we have seen refers to the idea of an internal cause, i.e. 
the idea of oneself as a cause. Doesn’t the “empty” acquiescentia that depends on external 
factors, such as the approval of other people, simply fail to qualify as acquiescentia – of any 
kind? This is not the case, because empty acquiescentia does involve an idea of oneself, as 
internal cause, but this idea is itself subject to external causes. In other words, it is a 
“mutilated” and “confused” idea in which one’s own power and activity; one’s assumptions 
about the moral status of certain actions, based on custom and education; the opinions and 
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reactions of others; and one’s (perhaps mistaken) perception of those opinions and reactions 
are all mixed up together. This is certainly an inadequate idea of oneself, produced by a 
combination of imagination and opinion – a self-image, we might say – but it is still an idea 
of oneself, and thus of an internal cause. 
 The link between acquiescentia and subjection to external causes indicates that a 
certain conception of obedience, or indeed acquiescence, helps to distinguish false from true 
acquiescentia. We are perhaps most used to a heteronomous notion of obedience, signifying 
submission to an external authority. Relatedly, ‘acquiescence’ usually refers to a rather 
passive acceptance of another’s will that is reluctant, helpless, or perhaps indifferent. This 
was equally true in the 17th century: Hobbes, for example, when discussing the interpretation 
of scripture in De Cive (1642) uses the verb acquiescere to describe heteronomous obedience 
to an external authority: authoritati externae acquiescere, non constituere citvitatem per se, 
sed esse externi illius subditos.73 But Spinoza’s use of acquiescentia suggests a much more 
affirmative conception of obedience, which encompasses both following the laws of one’s 
own nature, and wise acceptance of the necessity of divine law and (in other words) of the 
nature of which we are a part. This positive concept of obedience is itself complex, since it 
includes acquiescentia of the second and third kinds, and accommodates differences between 
them. I will call this ‘immanent obedience’, in contrast to the heteronomous obedience of 
false acquiescentia. (When we examine the two kinds of true acquiescentia, we will see that 
the immanent obedience belonging to the second kind of knowledge can be called 
autonomous, while the immanent obedience belonging to the third kind of knowledge is 
characterised by dependence on God.)74   
In the case of false acquiescentia, a person fails to follow the laws of his own nature 
insofar as he is determined by external causes. At the same time, he disobeys – that is to say, 
he refuses to accept – natural or divine necessity, insofar as he holds on to belief in free will. 
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His acquiescentia in se ipso fails to live up to its name, because it is not “in itself” but subject 
to external influence, even though it involves an idea of himself. Because his idea of himself 
is an inadequate self-image, mediated by the inconstant opinions of the multitude, the ‘self’ 
he acquiesces in is not really his self at all. According to a distinctive Spinozist concept of 
immanent obedience, then, false acquiescentia is characterised by a lack of obedience as well 
as by a lack of stillness. 
 
 
(2) Acquiescentia of the second kind 
 
As we have seen, in Ethics III Spinoza introduces acquiescentia as closely associated with 
imagination, and his discussion of the affect concerns either acquiescentia of the first kind, or 
a more general and neutral conception of acquiescentia which is not linked to any particular 
kind of cognition. In Part IV, however, he states that “Acquiescentia in se ipso can arise from 
reason, and only that acquiescentia in se ipso which does arise from reason is the greatest 
there can be.”75 He demonstrates this proposition by reminding the reader that “man’s true 
power of acting, or virtue, is reason itself (by IIIP3), which man considers clearly and 
distinctly.”76 And in elaborating it, Spinoza hints at both obedience and stillness. Concerning 
the former, he writes that “while a man considers himself, he perceives nothing clearly and 
distinctly, or adequately, except those things which follow from his power of 
understanding.”77 Concerning the latter, he emphasises that acquiescentia is (like virtue) an 
end in itself: it is “really the highest thing we can hope for” because “no one strives to 
preserve his being for the sake of any end.”78 We need to put these remarks together with 
others in the Ethics to see how they indicate the qualities of obedience and stillness that 
belong to true acquiescentia.  Let us begin with obedience. 
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 I have already suggested that Spinoza’s conception of adequate acquiescentia 
involves an affirmative obedience to oneself, understood as following the laws of one’s own 
nature. At EIIID2 he defines action (as opposed to passivity) in these terms: “we act when 
something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. when 
something in us or outside us follows from our nature.”79 He echoes this in Part IV, and links 
it explicitly with the second kind of knowledge: “acting from reason is nothing but doing 
those things which follow from the necessity of our nature, considered in itself alone (by 3p2 
and D2).”80 So when at EIVP52 Spinoza describes true acquiescentia in terms of a self-
reflection that consists of “those things which follow from [one’s] power of understanding,” 
he echoes his earlier reference to what “follows from our nature,” and anticipates his 
description of rational action, a few proposition later, as “doing those things which follow 
from the necessity of our nature.” Acquiescentia in se ipso is the affective, experiential aspect 
of obeying, i.e. expressing, our nature “considered in itself alone.” 
 Spinoza refers back to EIVP52 when, in Part V, he writes that “the highest 
satisfaction of mind [summa animi acquiescentia] stems from the right principle of living.”81 
We should “keep this in mind,” he advises, together with the fact that “men, like other things, 
act from the necessity of nature.”82 While the “fiction” of free will exacerbates the affects of 
love and hate, recognition of the way in which all beings follow “the necessity of nature” 
produces the peace of acquiescentia. This acquiescence in necessity is also emphasised in the 
Appendix to Part IV, where Spinoza suggests that it has a calming effect, even when we are 
subject to the vicissitudes of fortune: 
 
<ext> 
We do not have absolute power to adapt things outside us to our use. Nevertheless, we shall 
bear calmly [æquo animo feremus] those things which happen to us contrary to what the 
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principle of our advantage demands, if we are conscious that…we are a part of the whole of 
nature, whose order we follow. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us 
which is defined by understanding, i.e. the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied [plane 
acquiescet] with this, and will strive to persevere in that satisfaction [acquiescentia]. For 
insofar as we understand, we can want nothing except what is necessary, nor absolutely be 
satisfied [in veris acquiescere] with anything except what is true.83 
</ext> 
 
This passage echoes remarks about calm acceptance of “matters of fortune” at the end of Part 
II, in the lengthy scholium to P49.  Here Spinoza indicates “how much knowledge of [the 
will’s necessity] is to our advantage in life.” He explains that this understanding of necessity 
“teaches us how we must bear ourselves concerning matters of fortune, or things which are 
not in our power, that is, concerning things which do not follow from our nature – that we 
must expect and bear calmly [æquo animo exspectare, et ferre] both good fortune and bad.” 
He adds here that “all things follow from God’s eternal decree with the same eternal 
necessity as from the essence of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to two 
right angles.”84 
We can, then, identify two aspects of the immanent obedience of true acquiescentia. 
On the one hand, we actively follow the laws of our own nature when we are rational and 
virtuous (these being the same, for Spinoza). On the other hand, we actively follow the laws 
of nature as a whole when we are “conscious” that we are part of nature, and thus subject to 
it.85 Although the former aspect relates to what is within our control, and the latter aspect to 
what lies beyond it, both are based on adequate understanding, which is itself an expression 
of our own power, and thus a source of joy. Both, then, can be accurately described as true 
acquiescentia. 
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 In the passage from EIV’s Appendix quoted above, the obedience and stillness of 
acquiescentia are brought together. The person who obeys necessity is able to “bear [it] 
calmly.” Closely connected to this is a “satisfaction [acquiescentia]” that “wants nothing 
except what is necessary,” i.e. nothing except what is. This suggests a kind of desire that rests 
in itself, rather than seeking something that is lacking. Spinoza has already outlined such a 
desire, in discussing love at the end of Part III. Here he explains that the “will to join 
[oneself] to the thing loved [consists in] a Satisfaction [sed per voluntatem me 
Acquiescentiam intelligere] in the lover on account of the presence of the thing loved, by 
which the lover’s Joy is strengthened or at least encouraged.”86 This “will” rests content with 
what it has; because it does not want anything else, it can rest (or acquiesce) in the present 
moment.  
 The stillness experienced in acquiescentia of the second kind is a quality of stability 
and equanimity. In contrast to the emotional volatility that accompanies the first kind of 
knowledge, the feeling-quality of adequate understanding is much more even (æquo) and 
peaceful. When the mind thinks about “those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, 
and with which it is fully satisfied [plane acquiescit],” then not only will the affects of “Love, 
Hate, etc.” be destroyed (here Spinoza refers us back to his discussion of animi commotionem 
and animi fluctuationes), but also “the appetites, or Desires, which usually arises from such 
an affect, cannot be excessive.”87 The point here is not that desire is lessened by reason, but 
that rational desire is such that there cannot be too much of it: “a desire which arises from 
reason…is the very essence, or nature, of man”, and it makes no sense to say that human 
nature “could exceed itself, or could do more than it can”.88  
It is important to emphasise that the quietude of adequate acquiescentia is not inert. 
On the contrary, it is active as opposed to passive, and self-expressive as opposed to self-
restricting. And, given the interdependence of human beings on one another, the internal 
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stability of individuals whose acquiescentia comes from the second kind of knowledge will 
be conducive to political stability – and vice versa.89 If the nature of each being is its desire or 
striving, then adequate acquiescentia does not slow or halt this striving, but stabilises it, 
making it more immanent and less restless. On this point, we can note that in his Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus Spinoza uses the verb acquiescere to signify agreement or concord 
between people, in the context of a discussion of religious conflict: “people do not agree 
about everything [nec omnes in omnibus aeque acquiescere]; rather opinions govern men in 
different ways.”90 
The mental stability of acquiescentia has a bodily correlate in the affect that Spinoza 
describes as hilaritas (Curley: ‘cheerfulness’). In his “Definitions of the Affects” Spinoza 
seems rather dismissive of the affects “chiefly related to the body,” and does not define 
them.91 Earlier in Part III, however, he states that “the idea of any thing that increases or 
diminishes, aids or restrains, our body’s power of acting, increases or diminishes, aids or 
restrains, our mind’s power of thinking.”92  And, indeed, he describes hilaritas as “the affect 
of joy which is related to the mind and body at once.”93 In contrast to pleasure – which is also 
a joy relating to both mind and body – hilaritas affects all parts of the body equally.94 It is a 
condition of physical stability or equilibrium, just as genuine acquiescentia involves mental 
stability and equanimity. When the body is affected by hilaritas, “all its parts maintain the 
same proportion of motion and rest to one another.”95 Spinoza asserts that hilaritas “is always 
good, and cannot be excessive” – since stability cannot be excessive.96 But he reflects that 
this stability is very rare, “more easily conceived than observed.”97 Laurent Bove, who 
couples acquiescentia with hilaritas to accentuate the bodily aspects of adequate knowledge, 
and its blessedness, describes hilaritas as simultaneously restful and active. It is, he writes, “a 
kind of joy at rest [une joie en quelque sorte en repos]…but constitutive, active… the 
equilibrium in rest [l’equilibre en repos] of self-love is here immanent to the power of acting 
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itself… It is an active and creative [féconde] immobility.”98 In this way, hilaritas is very 
much the physical aspect of acquiescentia of the second kind: it is “the adequate expression 
of…the acquiescentia in se ipso originating in reason, and of the essential equilibrium that 
Contentment encompasses.”99 For Bove, Spinoza’s concept of hilaritas “indicates that the 
ethical goal is the acquiescentia in se ipso of the human being as a whole, equally and 
positively affected in all the parts of his body and his spirit.”100 
 
 
(3) Acquiescentia of the third kind 
 
Scientia intuitiva, Spinoza’s “third kind of cognition,” is a direct, immediate comprehension 
of God and of the way all things follow necessarily from God’s nature.101 What is known 
through this intuitive knowledge is the being-in-God of each singular thing: “Insofar as our 
mind knows itself and the body under a species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of 
God, and knows that it is in God.”102 This being-in-God is the basic principle of Spinoza’s 
ontology. He asserts at EIP15 that “Whatever is, is in God”, but elsewhere he expresses the 
same idea in the first person by appealing to the New Testament text of 1 John, “By this we 
know that we dwell in [God], and he in us.”103 The acquiescentia accompanying this 
knowledge that all things – but perhaps especially oneself – are in God shares the qualities of 
stability, equanimity, and obedience to one’s own nature that distinguish acquiescentia of the 
second kind from its false counterpart. But it also differs from the acquiescentia that is based 
solely on reason. Acquiescentia of the third kind is constituted by consciousness of being-in-
God, and it is very closely related to the intellectual love of God in which divine and human 
consciousness (and joy) come together.104 Indeed, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 
Spinoza, having cited Paul’s Letter to the Galatians on the “fruits of the Holy Spirit,” goes so 
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far as to suggest that “the Holy Spirit…is in truth simply the mental peace [animi 
acquiescentiam] that arises in the mind from good actions.”105 
 At EVP27 Spinoza writes that “the greatest satisfaction of Mind [Mentis 
acquiescentia] there can be arises from this third kind of knowledge.”106 This echoes his 
claim in Part IV that “only that acquiescentia in se ipso which [arises] from reason is the 
greatest there can be.”107 This does not seem to differentiate acquiescentia of the third kind 
from that of the second kind. We can note a change in terminology: here in Part V Spinoza 
uses the phrase Mentis acquiescentia for the first time (he repeats it at EVP32).108 However, 
he reverts to acquiescentia animi in the final proposition of the text, which describes the 
“blessedness” arising from intuitive knowledge.109 Spinoza also uses animi acquiescentia 
(together with the verb acquiescere) in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus to define 
blessedness: “true salvation and happiness [vera salus & beatitudo] consists in our intellect’s 
genuine acquiescence [vera animi acquiescentia] and we truly acquiesce [vera acquiescimus] 
only in what we understand very clearly.”110 So we cannot infer the distinguishing features of 
acquiescentia of the third kind from Spinoza’s references to Mentis acquiescentia.   
The Demonstration of EVP27 indicates that – as we might expect, given the nature of 
the third kind of cognition – this acquiescentia differs from the second kind by its connection 
to God. Having just argued that “the greatest virtue of the mind, that is, the mind’s power, or 
nature, or its greatest striving, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge,”111 
Spinoza explains that “he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the greatest 
human perfection, and consequently is affected with the greatest joy, accompanied by the 
idea of himself and his virtue. Therefore the greatest satisfaction [acquiescentia] there can be 
arises from this kind of knowledge.”112 In this third kind of cognition, however, the idea of 
oneself includes the idea of God: the mind “knows that it is in God and is conceived through 
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God.”113 This means that acquiescentia of the third kind is accompanied by the idea of God 
as well as by the idea of oneself: 
 
<ext> 
Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take pleasure in [eo delectamur], 
and our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as cause. 
From this kind of knowledge there arises the greatest satisfaction of Mind [Mentis 
acquiescentia] there can be (by P27), i.e. (by Def. Aff. XXV), Joy; this Joy is accompanied 
by the idea of oneself, and consequently (by P30) it is also accompanied by the idea of God, 
as its cause, q.e.d.114 
</ext> 
 
Spinoza introduces his concept of intellectual love of God in the Corollary to this 
proposition: “from this kind of knowledge there arises (by P32) Joy, accompanied by the idea 
of God as its cause, i.e., Love of God, not insofar as we imagine him as present (by P29), but 
insofar as we understand God to be eternal. And this is what I call intellectual love of 
God.”115 
According to Part III of the Ethics the affects of acquiescentia and love are 
distinguishable insofar as the former is a joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause 
(i.e. the idea of oneself), while the latter is a joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause 
(i.e. the idea of another). But the Demonstration of EVP32, quoted above, suggests that in the 
third kind of cognition this distinction between internal and external causes is unsettled. In 
place of two distinct ideas – an idea of oneself, and an idea of God – intuitive knowledge 
offers a single idea: of oneself as “in” God, or (to put it another way) of God’s nature as 
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containing and expressing this singular existing being. This single idea is an immediate 
awareness of being-in-God.  Spinoza makes this more explicit at VP36: 
 
<ext> 
The mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself… It 
is an action by which the mind contemplates itself, with the accompanying idea of God as its 
cause (by P32 and P32C), that is, an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained 
through the human mind, contemplates himself… Whether this love is related to God or to 
the mind, it can rightly be called satisfaction of mind [animi acquiescentia], which is not 
really distinguished from Glory. For insofar as it is related to God, it is joy (if I may still be 
permitted to use this term), accompanied by the idea of himself [as its cause]. And similarly 
insofar as it is related to the mind.116 
</ext> 
 
So although the intellectual love of God can be distinguished conceptually from 
acquiescentia of the third kind, phenomenologically they are inseparable. Both are a joy 
arising from the idea of one’s being-in-God, in other words a joyful awareness of being-in-
God.117  
In Ethics V, then, acquiescentia of the third kind and the intellectual love of God 
come together to constitute the affective dimension of the third kind of knowledge. Given 
that the intellectual love of God has already been much discussed by scholars,118 we might 
wonder what is to be gained by focusing on acquiescentia of the third kind. But there are 
several features of this affect particular to the concept of acquiescentia. Most obviously, the 
way it is used throughout the Ethics ties it explicitly to the existential fact of our relatedness 
to ourselves: the fact that we always operate with a certain self-understanding, which has a 
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certain emotional tone. Furthermore, the two distinctive features of acquiescentia that allow 
Spinoza to contrast true and false acquiescentia give content to the feeling-quality of the 
affect most commonly referred to as intellectual love of God. Unlike amor Dei intellectualis, 
acquiescentia conveys stillness, peace, rest. Just as these feeling-qualities provide a criterion 
for recognising true acquiescentia, so they fill out a phenomenological account of the 
blessedness associated particularly with the third kind of knowledge. And the idea of 
obedience that is invoked by acquiescentia gives content to both the being-in-God and the 
“freedom” attained in blessedness. 
 We have seen that the stillness belonging to acquiescentia of the second kind is not a 
state of immobility, but of stability, which contrasts with the instability accompanying the 
first kind of knowledge. It is an equanimity of mind, mirrored by equilibrium in the body 
(hilaritas). This stability is a prerequisite for gaining the third kind of knowledge (and thus 
for enjoying all that arises from it), but the stillness of acquiescentia of the third kind must 
differ from it. Acquiescentia of the second kind involves a stability of duration, while 
acquiescentia of the third kind involves the stillness of eternity.119   
 This highest kind of acquiescentia is closely tied to eternity when Spinoza describes 
“the wise man” at the very end of the Ethics: “the wise man, insofar as he is considered as 
such, is hardly troubled in spirit [vix animo movetur], but being, by a certain eternal 
necessity, conscious [conscius] of himself, and of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, 
but always possesses true peace of mind [sed semper vera animi acquiescentia].120 “Never 
ceasing to be” and “always possessing true peace of mind” are presented here as two aspects 
of a single condition, or even as two ways of describing the same condition. These closing 
comments reinforce Spinoza’s suggestion, a few propositions earlier, that acquiescentia of 
the third kind is linked to what “remains” of the mind after the body perishes: “because (by 
P27) the highest acquiescentia there can be arises from the third kind of knowledge, it 
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follows from this that the Mind can be of such a nature that the part of the Mind which we 
have shown perishes with the body (see P21) is of no moment in relation to what remains.”121 
This is not the place to reflect on Spinoza’s account of the eternity of the mind, which I have 
discussed in detail elsewhere.122 But we can consider how this connection with eternity 
qualifies acquiescentia of the third kind, and conversely how this acquiescentia gives an 
indication of the phenomenological quality of eternal life. Indeed, this illuminates Spinoza’s 
enigmatic claim that “we feel and know by experience that we are eternal,” for the 
uninterrupted peace and stillness that characterise acquiescentia of the third kind is the 
feeling of eternity.123 
 The three kinds of acquiescentia signify three different qualities of thinking: the 
unsettled, confused, anxious thinking of imagination and opinion; the stable, ordered thinking 
of reason; and the intuitive thinking that understands things immediately, as they are in God, 
sub specie aeternitatis. The thinking that takes place in the second kind of knowledge is a 
process of reasoning that traces, step by step, the logical connections between ideas and the 
causal connections between things. Intuitive thinking, however, is not a process: it grasps the 
truth immediately. This difference between the second and third kinds of cognition is 
illustrated by Spinoza’s example of finding a fourth proportional number, given a sequence 
of three numbers. In the second kind of cognition, the number is found by applying a 
Euclidian principle, once one has understood the demonstration of this principle. In the third 
kind of cognition, the fourth proportional is seen “in one glance.”124 So although this intuitive 
kind of thinking is certainly an activity, it is not a process. It sees what “follows” from God 
not as a sequence of effects, but as a simple, intelligible inherence or manifestation.   
This interpretation of acquiescentia of the third kind may be supported by a remark 
concerning the human intellect in Spinoza’s letter to Oldenburg of September 1661, where 
Spinoza lists the errors he finds in the philosophies of Descartes and Bacon. He criticises 
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Bacon in particular for placing certain limitations on the human intellect – a criticism that, in 
light of Spinoza’s mature epistemology, amounts to the claim that Bacon fails to recognise 
the possibility of the third kind of knowledge.125 Spinoza lists three key Baconian limitations, 
the third one being the assumption that “the human understanding is unquiet, it cannot stop or 
rest [quod intellectus humanus gliscat, neque consistere, aut acquiescere possit].”126 Here the 
verb acquiescere is used to signify the intellect’s capacity for repose. By putting acquiescere 
in contrast with gliscere, which means to swell up, blaze up, burst out, Spinoza seems to 
suggest that in the third kind of knowledge the mind is emptied of the clamouring crowd of 
images, “common notions”, and “ideas of the properties of things” which it uses for thinking 
according to the first and second kinds of knowledge.127 Insofar as acquiescentia of the third 
kind is an affect, it signifies the feeling-quality of intuitive thinking. It is not, then, simply an 
absence of emotional disturbance – although of course it is this as well. 
While acquiescentia of the third kind gives the deepest rest and peace, it also 
expresses the highest degree of activity and striving. Spinoza states that “the greatest virtue of 
the mind, that is, the mind’s power, or nature, or its greatest striving, is to understand things 
by the third kind of knowledge.”128 Just two propositions later he asserts that “the greatest 
acquiescentia there can be arises from this kind of knowledge.”129 There is something 
paradoxical about this, which Spinoza seems to acknowledge. The language of the affects 
becomes problematic in the third kind of cognition, and there is inevitably an element of 
“feigning” in speaking of an eternal joy, and of the “passage” to the third kind of 
acquiescentia.130 
 Just as the stillness of acquiescentia of the third kind is connected to the 
consciousness of things (including oneself) as being-in-God, sub specie aeternitatis, so the 
obedience aspect of this acquiescentia relates to the necessity of God’s nature. While 
acquiescentia of the second kind involves an affirmative, expressive ‘obedience’ to the laws 
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of one’s own nature, the highest acquiescentia sees these laws as divine laws, so that 
obedience to oneself becomes indistinguishable from obedience to God. Obedience to the 
God of superstitious religion, mediated by a confused amalgamation of imagination and 
received opinion, is inevitably a heteronomous submission. In this obedience, one’s own 
power of acting is surrendered to a God envisaged as external, and to a human authority 
which competes with one’s power, and diminishes it. Acquiescentia of the second kind 
reverses this weakening effect by making obedience immanent and autonomous. But it is in 
acquiescentia of the third kind, where one’s dependence on God is the core truth grasped in 
intuitive knowledge, that the highest human freedom is found. This is a different kind of 
autonomy, combining fidelity to one’s own finite power with the understanding that this is at 
once a dependent part, and an expression, of an infinite power.131   
Thus Spinoza’s concept of acquiescentia is central to his critique of Descartes’s 
account of human freedom. By correlating this affect to the three kinds of cognition, he 
relegates Cartesian acquiescentia to the first, inadequate kind of cognition, and argues that it 
is not only founded on error, but psychologically, spiritually and socially harmful. Spinoza 
employs the concept of acquiescentia to both critique and replace the Cartesian free will that 
he rejects as a “fiction”, for acquiescentia indicates a freedom that is identical to necessity. 
Insofar as this is a “human freedom” – as the title of Ethics V indicates – it participates in 
divine freedom. “God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one,” 
and “God alone is a free cause, for God alone exists only from the necessity of his nature.”132 
But a human being can approximate this freedom-in-necessity through his acquiescentia, 
“being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious of himself, and of God, and of things.”   
 
 
Conclusion: acquiescentia in theory and in practice 
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By now it should be clear why it is misleading to attribute to Spinoza the view that “self-
esteem is the highest thing we can hope for.” Most of the discussion, in Ethics III and IV, of 
the affect that Curley calls ‘self-esteem’ concerns acquiescentia of the first kind. We have 
seen that this acquiescentia in se ipso is defined in terms of imagination and opinion, which 
produce “mutilated and confused” cognition. This may appear to be a positive affect in 
contrast with humility and repentance, since it signifies an increase in power, and thus is a 
joy, not a sadness. But acquiescentia of the first kind is “empty”, “vain”, precisely insofar as 
it falls short of the qualities of stillness and immanent obedience that constitute “true” 
acquiescentia. That is to say, it is empty because it is volatile, anxiety-provoking, and 
heteronomous. One might as well say that ‘inadequate (or, more bluntly, false) acquiescentia 
is the highest thing we can hope for.’ And Spinoza does not, of course, think that.133 
 As a joy accompanied by the idea of oneself, acquiescentia signifies the feeling-
quality of the human being’s self-relatedness. This affect can be true or false – in the sense of 
authentic or inauthentic – depending on whether it arises from adequate or inadequate self-
understanding. Just as Spinoza distinguishes three kinds of cognition, the first kind 
inadequate and the second and third kinds adequate, so there are three corresponding kinds of 
acquiescentia. The name for this affect indicates the quality of stillness or repose (quies), and 
in moving from the first to the third kind we see an increase in stillness that is also, crucially, 
an increase in activity or power. This empowerment can be elucidated through a distinctive 
conception of immanent obedience: inadequate acquiescentia falls short of this criterion, 
while adequate acquiescentia fulfils it. 
Tracing these correlations between acquiescentia and the three kinds of cognition 
brings into view the three-fold structure of Spinoza’s account of acquiescentia. 
Corresponding to the three kinds of cognition –   
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(1) imagination (2) reason  (3) intuition 
 
– are three characteristics of acquiescentia, according to the criterion of stillness: 
 
(1) agitation   (2) stability    (3) rest 
 
The psychological states corresponding to these are:  
 
(1) anxiety    (2) equanimity   (3) peace 
 
And the forms of obedience are: 
 
(1) heteronomy   (2) autonomy   (3) being-in-God 
 
This three-fold structure exposes the error of Poiret’s claim that Spinozist acquiescentia is 
“an abominable vice, head and root of all of them, and true atheism.” This critique is based 
on the assumption that Spinoza describes as our highest good an affect which is directly 
opposed to the Christian virtues of humility and repentance. But the acquiescentia in se ipso 
that is distinguished from these other affects is acquiescentia of the first kind. This 
acquiescentia belongs, together with humility and repentance, within the domain of the 
imagination – the basis of superstitious religion – and so these affects are, according to 
Spinoza, equally volatile, confused, and debilitated. So Spinoza does not simply invert the 
traditional Christian schema of virtue and vice. Rather, he shows why this whole evaluative 
schema rests on misunderstanding. From this point of view, Poiret’s critique is itself rooted in 
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cognition of the first kind. It is a symptom of the superstition that Spinoza responds to, and 
the account of adequate acquiescentia developed through Ethics IV and V is an important 
part of this response. In fact, the highest kind of acquiescentia is far from atheistic and 
hubristic.134 On the contrary: it is distinguished by an obedience that is based on 
consciousness of being-in-God. And this yields a certain kind of humility (although Spinoza 
does not call it this), since it is a consciousness of ontological dependence on God. Of course, 
this ‘humility’ is not a feeling of weakness or smallness, but a feeling of the highest degree of 
power or activity that a human being can express, by virtue of “participation in the divine 
nature.”135 
 Spinoza’s definition of acquiescentia indicates the basic existential fact of human 
self-relatedness, and this affect, we have seen, is at the heart of his conception of the highest 
human good. This situates Spinoza’s practical philosophy within the ethical tradition 
described by Michel Foucault as “care for the self.”136 Through his account of acquiescentia, 
Spinoza shows how our self-relationship can be constituted heteronomously, and thus 
disempowered; he also indicates the possibility of a more empowering self-relation based on 
true self-understanding. Much more could be said about Spinoza’s contribution to the 
conception of philosophy as practice accentuated by Foucault, and explored by thinkers such 
as Pierre Hadot and, more recently, Peter Sloterdijk. Elsewhere I have shown how Ethics V 
offers an account of practice that puts the habit-producing operations of imaginative thinking 
outlined in Ethics II in the service of adequate knowledge.137 The theoretical discussion of 
acquiescentia set out in this paper needs to be developed further by showing how true 
acquiescentia might be practiced. In the Ethics Spinoza suggests certain techniques for 
cultivating this affect, while others might be inferred from his analysis of acquiescentia. 
There is no space here to elaborate on these practices.  But completing this work will place 
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Spinoza’s Ethics in a tradition of “philosophy as a way of life” informed by both Christian 
and Stoic spiritual exercises.   
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conceptions of self-love, see Bove, La stratégie du conatus, 87-8; Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 
203-4.   
135 E IVP45schol. 
136 For an overview, see Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 2, Introduction, chapter 3. See also 
L’Hermeneutique du sujet; “The Genealogy of Ethics” and “Concern for Self.” 
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